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This	  capstone	  critically	  engages	  with	  the	  work	  of	  prolific,	  contemporary	  continental	  
philosopher	  Luce	  Irigaray	  on	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  body	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  widely	  held	  
notions	  of	  the	  ill	  body	  in	  phallocentric	  culture.	  Within	  my	  project,	  phallocentrism	  means	  
the	  privileging	  of	  an	  erect,	  rational,	  individually	  autonomous	  body	  with	  defined	  
boundaries.	  Using	  sociologist	  Ken	  Plummer's	  journal	  during	  his	  liver	  disease,	  I	  extend	  
Irigaray's	  critique	  of	  phallocentrism	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  illness	  in	  Western	  culture.	  Ill	  
bodies	  occupy	  a	  space	  analogous	  to	  that	  of	  female	  bodies	  within	  Irigaray's	  theory,	  because	  
phallocentrism	  subordinates	  ill	  bodies	  to	  the	  normative	  phallic	  body	  that	  is	  functional,	  
bounded,	  and	  under	  control.	  I	  read	  Plummer's	  text	  as	  an	  example	  of	  Irigaray’s	  "sensible	  
transcendental":	  a	  non-­‐religious	  transcendence	  grounded	  in	  the	  body's	  sensibility.	  I	  argue	  
for	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  sensible	  transcendental	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  "speaking	  the	  sick	  body"	  to	  
disrupt	  troublesome	  phallocentric	  bodily	  ideals,	  and	  further	  that	  the	  sensible	  
transcendental	  may	  be	  an	  especially	  useful	  model	  for	  ill	  bodies	  because	  these	  bodies	  are	  in	  
























I	  am	  indebted	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  my	  advisor,	  Margaret	  Kamitsuka,	  who	  offered	  constant	  
support,	  expert	  guidance,	  and	  needed	  perspective	  throughout.	  Thank	  you	  for	  taking	  me	  on	  
as	  a	  late	  advisee	  without	  having	  once	  taught	  me,	  and	  for	  pointing	  me	  toward	  Irigaray.	  
Thanks	  to	  Tatum	  for	  suffering	  many	  hours	  of	  obscure	  discussion	  on	  this	  topic.	  You	  are	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  brilliant	  people	  I	  know.	  Thank	  you	  to	  Corey	  Barnes	  and	  the	  capstone	  class.	  I	  am	  
deeply	  humbled	  by	  each	  of	  your	  intellects	  and	  willingness	  to	  help.	  Finally,	  I	  cannot	  thank	  






















I	  affirm	  that	  I	  have	  adhered	  to	  the	  Honor	  Code	  in	  this	  assignment.	  
Sarah	  Kahn	  
	  
	   3	  
In	  this	  capstone,	  I	  use	  the	  work	  of	  Luce	  Irigaray	  as	  a	  theoretical	  lens	  through	  which	  
to	  address	  the	  experience	  of	  illness	  in	  Western	  culture.	  I	  use	  her	  category	  of	  the	  “feminine”	  
theoretically	  rather	  than	  literally.	  Understood	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  feminine	  body	  in	  Irigaray’s	  
work	  directly	  parallels	  the	  ill	  body;	  both	  suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  voice	  in	  phallocentrism.	  
Phallocentrism	  refers	  to	  the	  foundation	  of	  	  (Western)	  thought	  on	  the	  phallus	  as	  signifier	  of	  
meaning;	  phallocentrism	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  representational	  thought,	  including	  language,	  is	  
centered	  on	  theoretical	  qualities	  of	  the	  phallus.	  My	  main	  interlocutor,	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  is	  a	  
contemporary	  French	  theorist	  whose	  work	  spans	  the	  fields	  of	  philosophy,	  linguistics,	  
psychoanalysis,	  and	  religion	  and	  has	  been	  particularly	  influential	  in	  spheres	  of	  feminist	  
philosophy	  of	  religion.1	  Irigaray’s	  work	  weaves	  together	  concepts	  and	  genres	  and	  
deliberately	  evades	  straightforward	  meaning.	  Readings	  of	  Irigaray’s	  thought	  vary	  greatly;	  
while	  I	  must	  engage	  in	  some	  analysis	  of	  her	  thought,	  it	  is	  not	  this	  paper’s	  primary	  goal.	  I	  
reference	  scholarly	  readings	  of	  Irigaray’s	  texts	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  her	  thought	  when	  
necessary	  for	  my	  topic—for	  example,	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  sexual	  difference	  and	  divinity	  in	  her	  
work.	  Recent	  scholarship	  has	  taken	  Irigaray	  to	  task	  on	  her	  strict	  adherence	  to	  sexual	  
difference	  as	  the	  most	  immediate	  and,	  thus,	  significant	  oppressive	  force;2	  this	  paper	  
responds	  to	  this	  critique	  by	  extending	  Irigaray’s	  work	  on	  difference	  past	  gender.	  Illness	  
represents	  an	  instance	  where	  bodies	  of	  all	  gender	  identities	  fail	  to	  live	  up	  to	  phallocentric	  
ideals.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  Irigaray’s	  work	  and	  its	  reception,	  see	  Morny	  Joy,	  Divine	  Love:	  Luce	  
Irigaray,	  Women,	  Gender	  and	  Religion	  (New	  York:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  
2	  Danielle	  Poe,	  “Can	  Luce	  Irigaray’s	  Notion	  of	  Sexual	  Difference	  Be	  Applied	  to	  Transsexual	  
and	  Transgender	  Narratives?”	  in	  Thinking	  With	  Irigaray,	  ed.	  Mary	  C.	  Rawlinson	  et	  al.	  
(Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2011),	  111-­‐130.	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I	  see	  my	  project	  as	  dealing	  with	  both	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  concepts.	  For	  example,	  I	  
will	  follow	  some	  feminist	  scholars	  in	  questioning	  how	  the	  body	  is	  defined	  and	  delimited	  in	  
Western	  culture;	  the	  body	  in	  my	  paper	  will	  refer	  both	  to	  specific	  bodies	  and	  the	  cultural,	  
theoretical,	  social	  category	  of	  the	  body.	  I	  deal	  with	  illness	  not	  only	  as	  an	  individual	  
occurrence	  and	  experience,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  universal	  phenomenon	  with	  which	  we	  are	  all	  
familiar.	  The	  scholars	  I	  most	  heavily	  rely	  on,	  including	  Irigaray,	  see	  patriarchal	  culture	  as	  
holding	  bodies	  to	  troublesome	  ideals	  in	  various	  ways.	  Insofar	  as	  they	  critique	  a	  widespread	  
cultural,	  social,	  political,	  philosophical,	  religious,	  linguistic	  force,	  their	  work	  deals	  with	  both	  
the	  abstract	  and	  the	  immediately	  concrete.	  	  
Irigaray’s	  work	  generally	  responds	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  feminine	  embodied	  subjectivity	  
in	  phallocentric	  culture.	  Ill	  bodies,	  too,	  suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  linguistic	  and	  representational	  
possibility	  and	  thus	  are	  barred	  from	  becoming	  full	  subjects	  in	  phallocentric	  culture.	  To	  
extend	  Irigaray’s	  work	  on	  sexual	  difference,	  I	  will	  examine	  some	  specific	  characteristics	  
that	  she	  identifies	  with	  non-­‐conforming	  bodies.	  While	  scholars	  disagree	  on	  what	  Irigaray	  
means	  with	  her	  bodily	  imagery,	  I	  interpret	  Irigaray	  not	  as	  appealing	  to	  only	  certain	  bodies	  
but	  as	  appealing	  to	  repressed	  bodies	  generally.	  Similarly,	  I	  extend	  her	  claim	  that	  
patriarchal	  culture	  values	  women’s	  bodies	  for	  their	  functioning	  value	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  the	  
same	  for	  all	  bodies.	  While	  she	  appears	  to	  many	  interpreters	  to	  limit	  these	  characteristics	  to	  
traditionally	  assigned	  female	  bodies,	  I	  will	  follow	  scholars	  who	  interpret	  this	  work	  as	  
potentially	  not	  literal.	  I	  use	  Plummer’s	  experience	  to	  evaluate	  the	  viability	  of	  Irigaray’s	  
remedies	  for	  subjectivity	  of	  ill	  bodies.	  
In	  the	  first	  section,	  “The	  Experience	  of	  Illness	  in	  Phallocentric	  Culture,”	  I	  introduce	  
sociologist	  Ken	  Plummer’s	  journal	  from	  his	  experience	  with	  liver	  disease,	  highlighting	  the	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phallic	  characteristics	  of	  his	  body	  that	  underlie	  his	  experience.	  I	  discuss	  how	  these	  
conceptions	  become	  challenged	  and	  modified	  through	  the	  process	  of	  illness	  and	  healing.	  
Next,	  in	  the	  section	  “Irigaray’s	  Feminine	  and	  the	  Ill	  Body,”	  I	  introduce	  Luce	  Irigaray’s	  
critique	  of	  phallocentrism	  and	  explain	  how	  she	  ties	  phallocentric	  and	  non-­‐phallocentric	  
characteristics	  to	  the	  body.	  I	  demonstrate	  the	  parallels	  between	  the	  theoretical	  category	  of	  
the	  feminine	  in	  Irigaray’s	  thought	  and	  the	  category	  of	  the	  ill	  body	  (again	  both	  the	  specific	  
body	  of	  Plummer	  and	  the	  cultural,	  theoretical,	  social	  category	  of	  the	  ill	  body).	  Finally,	  in	  the	  
last	  section,	  “A	  Proposal	  for	  Rethinking	  the	  Ill	  Body,”	  I	  turn	  to	  Irigaray’s	  remedy	  for	  the	  
problem	  of	  female	  subjectivity:	  the	  “sensible	  transcendental.”	  Drawing	  on	  secondary	  
scholarship,	  I	  first	  explain	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  sensible	  transcendental.	  I	  move	  then	  to	  my	  
critical	  reading	  of	  Plummer’s	  journal	  as	  operating	  under	  a	  sensible	  transcendental	  mode.	  I	  
argue	  that	  for	  some	  ill	  bodies	  in	  Western	  culture,	  this	  non-­‐religious	  transcendence	  may	  
offer	  a	  compelling	  vehicle	  for	  a	  non-­‐phallocentric	  conception	  of	  the	  body.	  
	  
I.	  The	  Experience	  of	  Illness	  in	  Phallocentrism	  
	  
To	  lay	  the	  ground	  for	  my	  discussion	  of	  Irigaray	  and	  illness,	  I	  will	  introduce	  the	  
illness	  narrative	  of	  scholar	  Ken	  Plummer.	  While	  the	  terms	  phallocentric	  and	  non-­‐
phallocentric	  will	  make	  more	  sense	  at	  the	  discussion	  of	  Irigaray	  in	  the	  second	  section,	  I	  
first	  draw	  out	  corresponding	  imagery	  in	  Plummer’s	  text.	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  speak	  
for	  all	  bodies	  in	  any	  way	  throughout	  this	  paper,	  I	  use	  Plummer’s	  experience	  as	  an	  example	  
of	  how	  our	  social	  and	  cultural	  world	  can	  determine	  our	  experience	  of	  illness	  and	  our	  
bodies.	  Here,	  I	  follow	  feminist	  scholar	  Paula	  Cooey,	  who	  holds	  that,	  to	  a	  large	  degree,	  “even	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pain	  and	  pleasure	  are	  socially	  construed.”3	  In	  this	  case,	  Plummer’s	  journal	  documents	  the	  
challenges	  that	  illness	  presented	  to	  his	  conception	  of	  his	  own	  body.	  In	  Irigarayan	  
terminology	  that	  I	  will	  clarify	  more	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  Plummer	  comes	  to	  understand	  his	  
body	  as	  non-­‐phallocentric:	  for	  example	  as	  multiple,	  porous,	  and	  out	  of	  his	  sole	  control.	  He	  
also	  comes	  to	  recognize	  meanings	  of	  his	  illness	  outside	  of	  dualistic	  failure	  and	  function.	  In	  
identifying	  these	  themes	  within	  Plummer’s	  narrative,	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	  Plummer’s	  changed	  
perspective	  reveals	  a	  normative,	  phallocentric	  conception	  of	  his	  functioning,	  healthy	  body	  
as	  bounded	  and	  individually	  controlled.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  I	  will	  be	  reading	  
Plummer’s	  narrative	  in	  order	  to	  expose	  the	  underlying	  bias	  of	  his	  phallic	  conception	  of	  his	  
body,	  rather	  than	  within	  its	  originally	  intended	  context	  of	  social	  and	  philosophical	  theory.	  
All	  quotations	  in	  the	  following	  section	  refer	  to	  Plummer’s	  journal,	  which	  I	  will	  cite	  in-­‐text.	  	  
In	  his	  article	  “My	  Multiple	  Sick	  Bodies:	  Symbolic	  Interactionism,	  Autoethnography	  
and	  Embodiment,”	  Ken	  Plummer	  recalls	  his	  experience	  with	  end-­‐stage	  alcoholic-­‐related	  
liver	  disease.4	  Plummer’s	  words,	  drawn	  from	  his	  journal,	  represent	  his	  “body	  speaking”	  
(75-­‐76).	  This	  wording	  is	  significant,	  because	  it	  indicates	  a	  voice	  intimately	  connected	  to	  his	  
body	  rather	  than	  distanced	  from	  the	  body.	  Excerpts	  from	  his	  journal	  reflect	  Plummer’s	  
coming	  to	  grips	  with	  his	  new,	  ill	  self;	  the	  experience	  of	  his	  failing	  body	  prompted	  Plummer	  
to	  “ponder	  more	  and	  more	  the	  meanings	  and	  natures	  of	  life”	  (90)	  and	  to	  uncover	  many	  
social	  meanings	  of	  illness	  “from	  illness	  as	  opportunity	  to	  illness	  as	  stigma”	  (80).	  
Throughout	  his	  illness	  and	  recovery,	  Plummer’s	  ill	  body	  undermines	  normative	  ideals	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Paula	  M.	  Cooey,	  Religious	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Body:	  A	  Feminist	  Analysis	  (New	  York:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  90.	  
4	  Ken	  Plummer,	  “My	  Multiple	  Sick	  Bodies:	  Symbolic	  Interactionism,	  Autoethnography	  and	  
Embodiment,”	  in	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  Body	  Studies,	  ed.	  Bryan	  S.	  Turner	  (New	  York:	  
Routledge,	  2012),	  75-­‐93.	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“the	  old	  Ken”	  (81)	  had	  presumably	  taken	  for	  granted.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  I	  have	  chosen	  
to	  focus	  on	  the	  control	  or	  ownership	  of	  the	  body,	  oneness5,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  body	  as	  a	  
bounded,	  contained	  entity.	  I	  will	  also	  discuss	  how	  Plummer	  places	  his	  body	  along	  a	  binary	  
spectrum	  of	  failure	  and	  function	  based	  on	  these	  themes.	  As	  Plummer	  notes,	  “material	  
objects	  like	  blood	  and	  livers	  come	  to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  given	  sense”	  through	  social	  
processes:	  “never	  simply	  a	  discourse	  but	  an	  active	  process	  of	  narrating,	  symbolizing,	  
storying,	  even	  performing	  these	  material	  objects”	  (84).	  	  Plummer’s	  experience	  of	  his	  own	  
illness	  is	  mediated	  through	  the	  normative	  ideals	  of	  Western	  culture;	  Plummer’s	  sole	  
presence	  within	  his	  body,	  control	  of	  his	  body,	  and	  perceived	  limits	  of	  his	  body—taken	  for	  
granted	  while	  healthy—become	  challenged	  by	  his	  liver	  failure.	  Although	  I	  have	  isolated	  
these	  facets	  of	  phallocentrism’s	  normative	  body,	  I	  hold	  that	  they	  are	  experienced	  together	  
inseparably;	  closure,	  oneness,	  and	  ownership	  mean	  a	  healthy,	  functioning	  body	  in	  Western	  
culture.	  The	  subversion	  of	  these	  ideals	  in	  Plummer’s	  narrative	  coincides	  with	  his	  
perception	  that	  his	  body	  is	  failing.	  
Throughout	  Plummer’s	  journal,	  the	  prominent	  theme	  of	  his	  body’s	  shifting	  
boundaries	  presents	  itself	  in	  various	  ways.	  After	  initially	  noticing	  symptoms	  including	  
blackening	  legs,	  general	  pain	  and	  exhaustion,	  facial	  emaciation,	  and	  his	  growing	  “beer	  gut,”	  
Plummer	  visits	  the	  hospital	  to	  learn	  that	  that	  he	  had	  developed	  ascites—the	  abnormal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Although	  I	  will	  discuss	  Irigaray	  below,	  I	  want	  to	  note	  that	  I	  use	  “oneness”	  here	  to	  mean	  
the	  notion	  that	  one	  body	  contains	  one	  identity.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  self-­‐consciously	  to	  reflect	  
Irigaray’s	  frequent	  use	  of	  the	  word.	  For	  Irigaray,	  oneness	  denotes	  phallic	  self-­‐sameness.	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  phallic	  subject	  is	  one	  whose	  body	  contains	  one	  complete	  subject.	  The	  
phallic	  subject	  only	  interacts	  with	  others	  by	  way	  of,	  and	  in	  reference	  to,	  himself.	  The	  phallic	  
subject	  is	  a	  personified	  phallus	  in	  its	  oneness.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  feminine	  reflects	  the	  imagery	  
of	  lips,	  which	  are	  whole	  yet	  also	  divided,	  two	  and	  one	  simultaneously.	  The	  most	  
concentrated	  discussion	  of	  the	  phallic	  subject	  and	  the	  feminine,	  see	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  “Volume	  
Fluidity,”	  in	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman,	  trans.	  Gillian	  C.	  Gill	  (New	  York:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1985),	  227-­‐240.	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accumulation	  of	  fluid	  in	  his	  abdomen—and	  has	  ten	  liters	  of	  fluid	  removed	  through	  a	  pipe	  
(80).	  Although	  intended	  to	  heal,	  this	  initial	  encounter	  with	  his	  body’s	  fluids	  crossing	  his	  
body’s	  boundaries	  leaves	  Plummer	  feeling	  “Drained,	  threatened,	  sick”	  (80).	  In	  recovery,	  
Plummer	  recalls	  multiple	  instances	  when	  the	  conceived	  boundaries	  of	  his	  body	  are	  
transgressed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  healing:	  for	  example,	  the	  “cutting	  of	  surgery”	  or	  the	  image	  of	  
his	  bile	  flowing	  through	  tubes	  (83).	  Another	  time,	  Plummer	  experiences	  the	  uncontrollable	  
release	  of	  blood	  from	  his	  body	  in	  particularly	  vivid	  imagery;	  he	  describes	  “Blood	  pouring	  
involuntarily	  from	  me:	  a	  red	  liquid	  spewing	  from	  my	  mouth	  to	  half	  fill	  a	  sink”	  (83)	  and	  
“Deep	  thick	  red	  blood	  from	  inside	  my	  gut	  gushing	  out	  into	  the	  white	  sink	  involuntarily	  with	  
no	  warning”	  (84).	  The	  sometimes	  very	  visible	  flow	  of	  liquid	  out	  of	  Plummer’s	  body	  
challenges	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  his	  body;	  he	  describes	  the	  flow	  of	  liquids	  as	  
“shifting	  momentarily	  the	  borders	  of	  my	  body”	  (87).	  His	  experience	  with	  blood	  makes	  
evident	  the	  close	  relationship	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  bounded	  body	  with	  that	  of	  a	  controlled,	  
healthy	  body;	  despite	  the	  inward	  and	  outward	  flows	  of	  liquid	  that	  transgress	  the	  skin	  on	  a	  
daily	  basis,	  these	  experiences	  cause	  Plummer’s	  conception	  of	  his	  body’s	  limits	  to	  change.	  
The	  experience	  of	  his	  body’s	  fluids	  escaping	  its	  conceived	  boundaries	  is	  distressing	  to	  
Plummer—even	  when	  these	  processes	  directly	  facilitate	  his	  healing	  as	  in	  the	  draining—
because	  it	  challenges	  his	  authority	  over	  his	  body’s	  limits.	  In	  addition	  to	  fluids,	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  Plummer’s	  body	  are	  crossed	  in	  the	  healing	  process	  by	  a	  new	  liver.	  Plummer	  
feels	  a	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  his	  body	  with	  the	  replacement	  of	  his	  liver	  with	  that	  of	  an	  
eighteen-­‐year-­‐old.	  Ruminating	  over	  his	  transplanted	  organ,	  Plummer	  wonders	  if	  the	  soul	  of	  
the	  donor	  accompanies	  the	  liver	  (88).	  He	  feels	  he	  is	  no	  longer	  solely	  present	  in	  his	  body;	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  donor	  continues	  to	  live	  in	  him,	  making	  him	  “’two	  beings	  now	  in	  one’”	  (88).	  At	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other	  times,	  Plummer	  feels	  that	  he	  has	  relinquished	  control	  of	  his	  body	  to	  the	  hospital	  and	  
its	  machines	  (81).	  He	  describes	  his	  body	  as	  sometimes	  “not	  really	  open	  to	  my	  mind	  moving	  
it	  or	  owning	  it”	  (81),	  especially	  when,	  in	  surgery,	  his	  body	  was	  an	  “appendage	  served	  by	  
others	  and	  machines”	  (87).	  In	  recovery,	  when	  he	  must	  re-­‐learn	  everyday	  tasks,	  Plummer	  
feels	  he	  is	  reclaiming	  his	  body,	  bringing	  it	  “back	  under	  control	  again”	  (82)—a	  re-­‐
assembling	  or	  re-­‐birth	  (81).	  Physically	  unable	  to	  control	  his	  body,	  Plummer	  feels	  like	  a	  
different	  body—a	  “cyborg	  body…under	  siege”	  (80).	  Despite	  feeling	  “always	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  
the	  control”	  of	  his	  body,	  he	  says	  he	  “also	  felt	  it	  was	  invaded	  by	  forces	  outside	  of	  my	  control”	  
(88).	  This	  feeling	  of	  invasion	  reflects	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  body	  as	  strictly	  delimited,	  with	  
clear	  distinctions	  of	  inside	  and	  outside.	  Normal	  bodily	  experience	  for	  Plummer	  is	  one	  of	  a	  
single	  subject	  at	  the	  reins.	  The	  loss	  of	  liquids	  is	  experienced	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  control,	  and	  the	  
cutting	  of	  surgery	  and	  liver	  transplant	  feel	  invasive.	  For	  Plummer,	  then,	  the	  healthy,	  “old	  
Ken[‘s]”	  body	  is	  one	  that	  he	  has	  sole	  control	  over	  and	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  outer	  limits.	  	  
At	  other	  times	  within	  his	  journal,	  Plummer	  more	  directly	  reflects	  on	  his	  altered	  
subjectivity	  in	  illness	  that	  stems	  from	  his	  changing	  sense	  of	  body.	  He	  describes	  the	  
multiple,	  different	  “new	  worlds	  that	  illness	  inevitably	  takes	  you	  into”	  (85).	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  
of	  control	  he	  experiences,	  Plummer	  feels	  he	  is	  in	  a	  “new	  world	  of	  feeling”	  and	  shifted	  
consciousness	  (78-­‐79).	  His	  previously	  functioning	  “worlds	  of	  movement,	  clothing,	  hair,	  
drinking,	  eating,	  sleeping,	  washing,	  talking,	  thinking,	  and	  feeling	  –	  all	  moved	  into	  a	  different	  
key”	  (78-­‐79).	  His	  “illness	  world”	  (78)	  is	  one	  “where	  nothing	  worked;	  everything	  I	  touched	  
seemed	  to	  break	  or	  fall”	  (88).	  The	  world	  where	  his	  body	  did	  not	  function	  as	  before	  was	  one	  
of	  “constant	  flux	  and	  movement,”	  “uncertainty;”	  (85)	  “The	  world	  became	  a	  strange	  void	  in	  
which	  I	  shuffled	  and	  fell”	  (88).	  These	  worlds	  develop	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Plummer’s	  functioning,	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and	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  perception	  of	  his	  body	  as	  failing	  in	  various	  ways.	  When	  his	  
body	  is	  “broken”	  (83),	  “sick	  and	  failing”	  (80),	  and	  “in	  need	  of	  repair”	  (86),	  he	  lives	  in	  worlds	  
of	  uncertainty	  and	  flux.	  These	  worlds	  mean	  a	  “very	  different	  body”	  (81),	  an	  “utterly	  
estranged	  sick	  body”	  (81),	  “the	  cyborg	  body	  and	  the	  hallucinating	  body”	  (81),	  where	  he	  is	  
“certainly	  not	  the	  old	  Ken”	  (81).	  The	  “multiple	  bodies”	  (80)	  brought	  on	  by	  illness	  
correspond	  to	  these	  different	  worlds.	  Plummer	  also	  feels	  that	  he	  has	  a	  fundamentally	  
different	  body	  with	  the	  inability	  to	  retain	  fluids;	  he	  says	  that	  his	  “old	  body	  had	  gone”	  when	  
“None	  of	  my	  orifices	  were	  working	  on	  their	  own”	  (87).	  Similarly,	  he	  feels	  that	  he	  has	  
become	  “’two	  beings	  now	  in	  one’”—two	  bodies	  becoming	  one	  body	  because	  of	  the	  
transplanted	  liver	  (86).	  	  
The	  experience	  of	  his	  shifted	  bodily	  boundaries,	  coupled	  with	  relinquished	  control,	  
leave	  Plummer	  feeling	  like	  he	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  person(s).	  This	  makes	  sense	  
when	  we	  hear	  that	  Plummer	  conceives	  of	  his	  body	  as	  his	  “shape,”	  “container,”	  “border,”	  
“shell	  and	  armor”	  (86).	  When	  we	  consider	  that	  Plummer’s	  instinct	  is	  to	  conceive	  of	  his	  body	  
as	  an	  outer	  limit,	  holding	  him	  in	  and	  “holding	  it	  all	  together”	  (86),	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  
challenges	  to	  this	  understanding	  force	  him	  to	  change	  his	  conception	  of	  his	  body	  and	  
likewise	  his	  subjectivity.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  his	  healing	  process,	  Plummer	  reflects	  on	  the	  
different	  understandings	  his	  illness	  prompted.	  His	  illness	  was,	  for	  him,	  a	  “journey	  of	  
exploration”	  (79),	  in	  which	  he	  finds	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  all	  bodies.	  Through	  the	  
dependence	  he	  feels	  on	  other	  bodies—probably	  meaning	  his	  liver	  donor’s	  and	  those	  of	  
hospital	  staff	  and	  loved	  ones—Plummer	  understands	  that	  “The	  reflexive	  self	  dwells	  in	  a	  
network	  of	  bodies	  and	  others”	  where	  it	  becomes	  “identifiably	  multiple”	  (85).	  Plummer’s	  
illness	  forces	  him	  to	  adjust	  his	  conception	  of	  his	  own	  body	  from	  an	  autonomous	  body	  that	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retains	  its	  borders	  to	  in	  flux	  and	  multiple	  bodies.	  The	  changes	  in	  Plummer’s	  conception	  of	  
his	  body	  correspond	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  his	  subjectivity—from	  healthy	  Ken	  to	  multiple	  Kens	  
in	  flux.	  Through	  the	  imagery	  he	  chooses	  to	  describe	  his	  experience,	  Plummer	  reveals	  a	  
conception	  of	  his	  healthy	  body	  as	  phallic,	  meaning	  here	  one,	  coherent,	  under	  control,	  and	  
bounded.	  His	  use	  of	  this	  imagery	  to	  describe	  his	  body,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  imagery	  that	  describes	  
the	  ill	  body	  as	  being	  out	  of	  control,	  being	  fundamentally	  not-­‐one,	  and	  having	  shifted	  
boundaries,	  parallels	  Irigaray’s	  category	  of	  the	  feminine.	  	  
	  
II.	  Irigaray’s	  Feminine	  as	  the	  Ill	  Body	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  locate	  Irigaray’s	  feminine	  imagery	  within	  Plummer’s	  experience,	  I	  will	  
first	  provide	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  Luce	  Irigaray’s	  thought	  and	  then	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  ill	  bodies	  are	  “feminized”	  in	  her	  account	  of	  phallocentric	  culture.	  Irigaray	  sees	  
phallocentrism	  as	  denying	  full	  subjectivity	  within	  symbolic	  thought	  to	  women	  in	  their	  
sexual,	  embodied	  difference	  from	  men.6	  Although	  her	  strict	  adherence	  to	  binary	  sexual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  issue	  of	  what	  exactly	  Irigaray	  means	  by	  “woman”	  and	  “the	  feminine”	  is	  at	  the	  center	  
of	  the	  questions	  of	  essentialism	  and	  heterosexism	  in	  her	  work.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
current	  paper	  to	  fully	  address	  what	  Irigaray	  means;	  however,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  Irigaray’s	  
criticism	  of	  psychoanalyst	  Jacques	  Lacan	  focuses	  on	  his	  refusal	  to	  associate	  the	  signifier	  
phallus	  with	  the	  physical	  penis.	  Irigaray	  appears	  to	  create	  a	  more	  direct	  slide	  between	  
feminine	  bodily	  imagery-­‐the	  breasts,	  mucous	  membranes,	  vulvae,	  and	  lips-­‐and	  its	  
signifiers.	  Diana	  Fuss	  argues	  that	  Irigaray	  strategically	  uses	  essentialist	  language,	  but	  never	  
herself	  defines	  woman’s	  essence.	  Rather,	  her	  use	  of	  bodily	  language	  is	  neither	  literal	  nor	  
metaphorical,	  but	  metonymic.	  See	  Diana	  J.	  Fuss,	  “‘Essentially	  Speaking’:	  Lucy	  Irigaray’s	  
Language	  of	  Essence,”	  Hypatia	  3	  no.	  3	  (1989):	  62-­‐81.	  Danielle	  Poe	  posits	  that	  for	  Irigaray,	  
sexual	  difference	  is	  not	  natural	  because	  it	  is	  biologically	  determined,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  
always	  present	  in	  individuals.	  She,	  along	  with	  Amy	  Hollywood	  in	  Sensible	  Ecstasy:	  
Mysticism,	  Sexual	  Difference,	  and	  the	  Demands	  of	  History	  (Chicago,	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  
2002),	  sees	  Irigaray’s	  concept	  of	  sexual	  difference	  as	  historically	  variable,	  not	  static.	  See	  
Poe,	  “Can	  Luce	  Irigaray’s	  Notion	  of	  Sexual	  Difference	  Be	  Applied	  to	  Transsexual	  and	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difference	  has	  troubled	  many	  of	  her	  readers,	  Irigaray	  argues	  that	  bringing	  female	  bodily	  
specificity	  into	  discourse	  (language	  and	  symbolic	  representation)	  will	  help	  to	  establish	  
women	  as	  full	  subjects.	  Here,	  I	  extend	  Irigaray’s	  argument	  to	  apply	  to	  ill	  bodies	  within	  the	  
embodied	  difference	  of	  illness.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  take	  Irigaray’s	  critique	  of	  phallocentrism	  
to	  be	  a	  primarily	  symbolic	  one	  that	  can	  apply	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  embodied	  difference	  than	  
simply	  the	  sexual	  and	  argue	  that	  ill	  bodies	  occupy	  the	  same	  place	  as	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  
feminine.	  While	  Irigaray’s	  focus	  on	  sexual	  difference	  as	  the	  most	  universal	  and	  
fundamental	  form	  of	  embodied	  difference	  has	  troubled	  scholars,	  the	  embodied	  difference	  
of	  illness	  is	  universal	  and	  thus	  deserving	  of	  attention.	  
In	  her	  first	  major	  work	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  English,	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman,	  
Irigaray	  engages	  in	  a	  widespread	  cultural	  critique	  of	  Western	  thought	  in	  general.7	  
Discussing	  the	  general	  trend	  of	  ignorance	  and	  neglect	  of	  the	  feminine	  in	  authors	  from	  
Freud	  to	  Plato,	  Irigaray	  argues	  that	  the	  entire	  foundation	  of	  Western	  thought	  is	  conceived	  
on	  masculine	  terms.	  Beginning	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  Freud,	  Irigaray	  points	  out	  that	  the	  
leading	  psychoanalytic	  explanation	  of	  the	  feminine	  revolves	  around	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  
penis	  and	  resulting	  envy.8	  Throughout	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  psychological	  and	  social	  
development	  of	  individuals,	  the	  feminine	  is	  explained	  solely	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  masculine.9	  
Generally,	  the	  phallus	  (symbolic	  representation	  of	  the	  penis)	  “functions	  all	  too	  often	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Transgender	  Narratives?”	  For	  more	  discussion	  of	  bodily	  imagery	  and	  its	  symbolic	  
representation	  in	  Irigaray’s	  work,	  see	  Margaret	  Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic,”	  
Hypatia	  6,	  no.	  3	  (1991):	  97-­‐110.	  
7	  A	  fully	  detailed	  account	  of	  Irigaray’s	  critique	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper;	  for	  an	  
introduction,	  see	  Margaret	  Whitford,	  Luce	  Irigaray:	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Feminine	  (New	  York:	  
Routledge,	  1991).	  
8	  See	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  11-­‐112.	  
9	  For	  example,	  the	  clitoris	  is	  explained	  as	  a	  defective,	  inadequate	  small	  penis	  and	  the	  
breasts	  and	  vagina	  are	  described	  as	  secondary	  organs.	  See	  ibid.,	  22-­‐23.	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psychoanalysis	  as	  the	  guarantee	  of	  sense,	  the	  sense	  of	  sense(s),	  the	  ‘figure,’	  the	  ‘form,’	  the	  
‘ultimate	  signifier;’”10	  this	  means	  that	  all	  metaphysical	  thought	  refers	  back	  to	  phallic	  
meaning.	  When	  individuals	  speak—necessarily	  as	  selves	  or	  subjects—it	  is	  always	  as	  phallic	  
subjects;	  those	  concerned	  with	  truth,	  meaning,	  form,	  and	  coherence.	  Subjectivity	  refers	  to	  
the	  assumption	  of	  a	  “self”	  in	  language	  and	  discourse—the	  symbolic	  realm.	  Subjectivity	  
means	  the	  position	  one	  must	  take	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  into	  language	  or	  symbolic	  thought.	  For	  
Irigaray,	  the	  speaking	  “subject”	  in	  Western	  thought	  is	  always	  symbolically	  phallic.11	  Those	  
individuals	  with	  penises	  have	  a	  natural	  advantage	  in	  phallocentrism,	  since	  phallocentrism	  
is	  the	  general	  culture	  of	  privileging	  the	  phallic.	  Irigaray	  argues	  that	  phallocentrism	  is	  
present	  in	  all	  claims	  to	  truth	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  For	  Irigaray,	  the	  term	  
“phallocentrism”	  is	  almost	  synonymous	  with	  “economy	  of	  the	  same”	  or	  “self-­‐sameness”	  and	  
the	  “economy	  of	  truth.”	  All	  refer	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  discourse	  is	  centered	  on	  the	  masculine,	  
phallic	  subject,	  and	  that	  relations	  with	  others	  (women)	  serve	  to	  reflect	  back	  this	  masculine	  
subjectivity.	  So,	  for	  example,	  Freud	  describes	  female	  sexuality	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  clitoris	  being	  
a	  defective	  penis	  rather	  than	  retaining	  its	  difference	  from	  the	  penis.	  Female	  sexuality	  in	  
other	  places	  is	  equated	  with	  motherhood,	  an	  assumption	  that	  Irigaray	  attributes	  to	  
motherhood’s	  physical	  “preserving,	  regenerating,	  and	  rejuvenating”	  of	  man	  through	  
reproduction.12	  Phallocentrism	  also	  maintains	  binary	  logic,	  inscribing	  the	  dualistic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  44.	  
11	  This	  point	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  title	  of	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	  Speculum,	  “Any	  Theory	  of	  the	  
‘Subject’	  has	  Always	  Been	  Appropriated	  by	  the	  ‘Masculine,’”	  133-­‐146.	  The	  category	  of	  the	  
“phallic”	  is	  symbolic	  and	  physical.	  Scholars	  have	  struggled	  with	  this	  issue	  in	  Irigaray’s	  
writing,	  and	  I	  will	  address	  this	  further	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  symbolic	  nature	  of	  Irigaray’s	  
work.	  	  
12	  Ibid.,	  53.	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categories	  of	  presence	  versus	  absence,	  inside	  versus	  outside,	  visible	  versus	  invisible	  which	  
are	  physically	  and	  metaphorically	  based	  on	  the	  erect	  penis.	  	  
For	  Irigaray,	  the	  fact	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  are	  dominated	  and	  founded	  by	  men	  
means	  that	  women	  do	  not	  have	  the	  representational	  resources	  needed	  to	  express	  their	  
own	  subjectivity	  given	  their	  bodily	  specificity.	  This	  subjectivity	  would	  defy	  phallic	  
standards	  of	  rationality	  and	  coherence	  and	  require	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  language	  and	  society.	  
Here,	  Irigaray	  turns	  to	  imagery	  grounded	  in	  what—for	  her—represents	  the	  feminine	  body.	  
This	  imagery	  not	  only	  begins	  to	  bring	  female	  bodies—thus,	  female	  subjectivity—into	  
language,	  but	  also	  undermines	  phallic	  values	  in	  the	  process.	  Against	  phallic	  oneness,	  
Irigaray	  introduces	  imagery	  of	  the	  woman,	  “who	  doesn’t	  have	  one	  sex	  organ,	  or	  a	  unified	  
sexuality…Body,	  breasts,	  pubis,	  clitoris,	  labia,	  vulva,	  vagina,	  neck	  of	  the	  uterus,	  womb…all	  
these	  foil	  any	  attempt	  at	  reducing	  sexual	  multiplicity	  to	  some	  proper	  noun,	  to	  some	  proper	  
meaning,	  to	  some	  concept.”13	  Irigaray	  further	  says	  that	  for	  the	  woman,	  “two	  does	  not	  divide	  
into	  ones.”14	  These	  images	  both	  attempt	  to	  describe	  the	  experience	  of	  feminine	  bodily	  
specificity	  and	  also	  to	  undermine	  the	  phallic	  model;	  when	  she	  describes	  lips	  as	  “strangers	  
to	  dichotomy	  and	  oppositions,”	  we	  can	  read	  her	  as	  both	  describing	  the	  physical	  property	  of	  
feminine	  bodies	  and	  also	  extending	  this	  physicality	  into	  a	  subversive	  symbol.15	  Irigaray’s	  
oeuvre	  is	  rich	  with	  imagery	  like	  this,	  which	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  represents	  the	  “sensible	  
transcendental.”	  I	  will	  discuss	  other	  examples	  below	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  Plummer’s	  
experience.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  233.	  
14	  Ibid.,	  236.	  This	  quote	  appears	  to	  refer	  physically	  to	  lips,	  but	  I	  believe	  carries	  symbolic	  
weight	  as	  well.	  
15	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference,	  ed.	  Carolyn	  Burke	  et	  al.	  (New	  York:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1993),	  18.	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While	  the	  issue	  of	  sexual	  difference	  underlies	  and	  frames	  Irigaray’s	  entire	  project,	  
scholars	  have	  struggled	  with	  Irigaray’s	  focus	  on	  sexual	  difference	  as	  immediate	  and	  
universal.	  	  An	  important	  question	  for	  interpreters	  of	  Irigaray	  becomes	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
the	  symbolic	  categories	  of	  phallic	  and	  non-­‐phallic	  are	  allied	  with	  the	  categories	  of	  
masculine	  and	  feminine.	  Throughout	  her	  work,	  Irigaray	  employs	  fluid	  language	  for	  these	  
categories,	  such	  that	  clearly	  defining	  which	  bodies	  count	  as	  “phallic”	  or	  “feminine”	  becomes	  
difficult.	  Scholars	  wonder	  if	  Irigaray’s	  “feminine”	  is	  merely	  a	  biological	  category,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  
symbolic	  and	  applicable	  to	  different	  genders.16	  Regardless	  of	  Irigaray’s	  intention,	  I	  follow	  
Margaret	  Whitford’s	  interpretation	  of	  Irigaray’s	  thought	  as	  symbolically	  charged	  and	  not	  
necessarily	  aligned	  with	  biology.17	  	  
I	  identify	  the	  central	  phallic	  ideals	  of	  visibility,	  coherence,	  unity,	  solidity,	  and	  
functionality	  in	  Irigaray’s	  work	  as	  ideals	  that	  also	  apply	  to	  ill	  bodies	  as	  in	  Plummer’s	  text.	  
Phallocentric	  culture	  prescribes	  these	  characteristics	  normatively	  on	  all	  bodies	  regardless	  
of	  gender.	  Irigaray’s	  critique	  centers	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  femininity	  from	  representation;	  in	  
the	  symbolic	  order,	  women	  do	  not	  have	  their	  own	  gender.18	  Irigaray	  identifies	  this	  lack	  of	  
representation	  as	  plaguing	  not	  only	  psychoanalysis	  but	  also	  Western	  philosophy,	  language,	  
and	  thought	  in	  general.	  To	  undermine	  the	  phallic	  mode	  of	  being	  that	  valorizes	  abstracted	  
qualities	  of	  an	  erect	  penis—unity,	  visibility,	  coherence,	  solidity,	  functionality—Irigaray	  
turns	  to	  imagery	  of	  feminine	  bodies.	  In	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman,	  for	  example,	  Irigaray	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Readers	  of	  Irigaray,	  especially	  North	  American	  feminist	  scholars,	  have	  struggled	  with	  her	  
focus	  on	  sexual	  difference	  as	  the	  most	  immediate	  and	  universal	  form	  of	  embodied	  
difference.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Fuss,	  “’Essentially	  Speaking.’”	  
17	  Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic."	  
18	  Since	  the	  only	  subject	  position	  available	  is	  a	  masculine	  one,	  when	  women	  speak	  within	  
the	  laws	  of	  Western	  discourse	  they	  occupy	  a	  masculine	  subjectivity.	  According	  to	  Irigaray,	  
no	  subjectivity	  specific	  to	  women	  is	  yet	  available.	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evokes	  a	  female	  mystic	  celebrating	  the	  open	  expansiveness	  of	  her	  genitalia	  and	  body.19	  She	  
describes	  the	  ecstasy	  found	  in	  “that	  glorious	  slit,”20	  the	  “gaping	  space”	  of	  the	  “loving	  
body,”21	  where	  an	  infinite	  whole	  touches	  herself.22	  Elsewhere,	  Irigaray	  describes	  the	  
fluidity	  of	  the	  female	  body;	  to	  phallocentric	  culture	  this	  fluidity	  is	  repulsive,	  horrific,	  
abhorrent	  and	  shameful.23	  This	  fluidity	  threatens	  to	  “deform,	  propagate,	  evaporate,	  
consume	  him,	  to	  flow	  out	  of	  him	  and	  into	  another;”24	  by	  “him,”	  Irigaray	  means	  the	  phallic	  
subject—closed	  off,	  autonomous,	  in	  control,	  rational,	  cohesive	  and	  unified.	  
Irigaray	  also	  critiques	  the	  expectation	  of	  functionality	  placed	  upon	  (female)	  bodies	  
in	  phallocentrism.	  She	  points	  out	  that	  phallocentric	  culture	  equates	  woman’s	  sexuality	  with	  
reproduction,	  asking	  when	  culture	  will	  cease	  to	  “claim	  that	  her	  sexuality	  has	  value	  only	  
insofar	  as	  it	  gathers	  the	  heritage	  of	  her	  maternity.”25	  While	  Irigaray	  focuses	  her	  discussion	  
solely	  on	  female	  bodies	  and	  the	  expectation	  of	  reproduction,	  we	  can	  apply	  her	  critique	  to	  
any	  expectation	  of	  bodies	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  vision	  of	  functionality.	  This	  expectation	  represents	  
an	  appropriation	  of	  another’s	  body,	  which	  Irigaray	  condemns	  throughout	  her	  work.	  When	  
women	  are	  fixed	  into	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  motherhood,	  for	  example,	  they	  cannot	  truly	  
become	  subjects—the	  infinite	  possibilities	  for	  their	  personhood	  are	  paralyzed.26	  Extending	  
this	  critique	  to	  all	  bodies,	  we	  can	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  expectation	  of	  health	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  See	  Irigaray,	  “La	  Mystérique,”	  in	  Speculum,	  191-­‐202.	  Here,	  Irigaray	  associates	  qualities	  of	  
the	  mystic’s	  body	  with	  those	  of	  Christ.	  Later,	  Irigaray	  rejects	  this	  Christological	  association	  
in	  favor	  of	  an	  entirely	  different	  divinity.	  See	  Morny	  Joy,	  “Equality	  or	  Divinity:	  A	  False	  
Dichotomy?”	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	  Studies	  in	  Religion	  6,	  no.	  1	  (1990):	  9-­‐24.	  
20	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  200.	  
21	  Ibid..	  
22	  Ibid.,	  233.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  288;	  ibid.,	  237.	  
24	  Ibid..	  
25	  Ibid.,	  146.	  
26	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  Sexes	  and	  Genealogies,	  trans.	  Gillian	  C.	  Gill	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  
Press,	  1993)	  62.	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appropriation	  of	  another’s	  body	  by	  phallocentric	  culture.	  The	  culture	  of	  phallocentrism,	  in	  
which	  our	  body	  is	  valued	  for	  its	  health,	  is	  the	  same	  culture	  that	  garners	  profit	  from	  both	  
our	  health	  and	  healing,	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  our	  reproduction,	  requires	  us	  to	  be	  drafted	  
into	  militaries,	  and	  polices	  our	  bodies	  more	  or	  less	  depending	  on	  appearance.	  Through	  and	  
through,	  phallocentric	  culture	  appropriates	  all	  bodies.	  Although	  the	  specific	  instances	  of	  
appropriation	  certainly	  vary	  depending	  on	  gender,	  the	  expectation	  of	  health	  affects	  us	  all.	  
Responding	  to	  the	  apparent	  biological	  essentialism	  present	  in	  Irigaray’s	  work,	  some	  
defenders	  have	  attempted	  to	  extend	  Irigaray’s	  feminine	  bodily	  imagery	  more	  broadly.	  In	  
response	  to	  Irigaray’s	  lips	  and	  mucous	  imagery,	  Margaret	  Whitford	  offers	  a	  reading	  of	  this	  
imagery	  that	  questions	  the	  strict	  association	  of	  lips	  and	  mucous	  with	  feminine	  bodies.	  
Rather	  than	  simply	  the	  feminine	  body,	  “mucous	  represents	  the	  most	  ‘unthought’	  and	  
‘unthinkable’	  of	  Western	  culture.”27	  This	  means	  that	  Western	  culture’s	  phallocentrism	  
precludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  symbolic	  representation	  for	  any	  bodily	  specificity	  and	  identity	  
outside	  its	  ideals.	  Since	  mucous	  is	  a	  substance	  not	  easily	  categorized	  within	  phallocentric	  
binaries	  (for	  example,	  solid	  versus	  fluid),	  it	  exists	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  what	  is	  
representable	  and	  valued	  in	  language	  and	  thought.	  As	  a	  symbolic	  image,	  mucous	  defies	  the	  
typical	  phallic	  categorization	  of	  solid	  or	  fluid.	  Even	  if	  intended	  by	  Irigaray	  solely	  with	  literal	  
reference	  to	  the	  female	  body,	  Whitford	  argues	  that	  the	  images	  have	  succeeded	  in	  serving	  as	  
redemptive	  symbols	  for	  women—the	  entry	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  into	  the	  previously	  
phallocentric	  symbolic	  order.	  So,	  what	  is	  important	  about	  Irigaray’s	  imagery	  for	  Whitford	  is	  
its	  subversion	  of	  phallocentric	  binaries	  applied	  to	  bodies,	  like	  interior	  versus	  exterior,	  sight	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic,”	  102.	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versus	  touch,	  openness	  versus	  closure,	  and	  subject	  versus	  object.28	  Although	  Whitford	  
identifies	  this	  symbolic	  value	  primarily	  for	  women,	  she	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
possibility	  of	  readings	  of	  sexual	  difference;	  “what	  is	  important	  about	  the	  two	  lips	  is	  not	  only	  
their	  literalness,	  but,	  above	  all,	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  one	  can	  agree	  on	  exactly	  what	  they	  mean.”29	  
Diana	  Fuss	  also	  argues	  that	  “many	  of	  the	  properties	  Irigaray	  associates	  with	  the	  two	  lips	  
might	  also	  describe	  the	  penis.”30	  Specifically,	  the	  “two	  but	  not	  divisible	  into	  ones”	  may	  also	  
describe	  a	  penis	  with	  foreskin.	  Further,	  the	  qualities	  Irigaray	  associates	  with	  the	  phallus	  
may	  be	  an	  oversimplified	  symbolic	  representation	  of	  a	  phallus	  rather	  than	  a	  real	  penis;	  “As	  
K.K.	  Ruthven	  points	  out…’Certainly,	  her	  theory	  seems	  to	  require	  the	  penis	  to	  be	  always	  
inflexibly	  erect	  and	  quite	  without	  metaphoric	  variation,	  and	  also	  to	  be	  circumcised.’”31	  
These	  readings	  of	  Irigaray	  open	  her	  apparent	  dualism	  of	  sexual	  difference	  to	  a	  more	  fluid	  
one;	  the	  specificities	  she	  seems	  to	  limit	  to	  feminine	  bodies	  can	  describe	  bodies	  typically	  
designated	  male,	  and	  phallic	  characteristics	  may	  not	  describe	  real	  bodies.	  
A	  more	  fluid	  picture	  of	  sexual	  difference	  is	  not	  necessarily	  limited	  to	  secondary	  
interpretations	  of	  Irigaray’s	  texts.	  At	  times	  in	  her	  writing,	  Irigaray	  herself	  appears	  to	  blur	  
distinctions	  between	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  bodies.	  English-­‐speaking	  defenders	  of	  
Irigaray	  tend	  to	  interpret	  her	  idea	  of	  sexual	  difference	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  the	  
work	  of	  Margaret	  Whitford,	  Morny	  Joy,	  Penelope	  Deutscher,	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	  Danielle	  Poe,	  
and	  others	  for	  this	  type	  of	  reading.	  In	  Speculum,	  Irigaray	  refers	  to	  “women.	  Or	  at	  least	  the	  
‘female.’”32	  The	  use	  of	  quotation	  marks	  around	  “female”	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic,”	  102-­‐103.	  
29	  Ibid.,	  98.	  
30	  Fuss,	  “’Essentially	  Speaking,’”	  65-­‐66.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  66.	  
32	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  192.	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“women”	  and	  “female”	  indicates	  that	  “female”	  could	  mean	  a	  symbolic	  category	  for	  bodily	  
experience	  that	  exists	  outside	  phallocentrism	  rather	  than	  strictly	  female	  bodies.	  Elsewhere	  
in	  Speculum,	  she	  indicates	  that	  “he”	  may	  enter	  non-­‐phallocentric	  “mystic	  language	  or	  
discourse,”	  “if	  he	  follows	  ‘her’	  lead.”33	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  masculine	  bodies	  
outside	  of	  phallocentrism.	  At	  other	  times,	  Irigaray	  critiques	  a	  rigid	  picture	  of	  femininity;	  “a	  
femininity	  that	  conforms	  and	  corresponds	  too	  exactly	  to	  an	  idea—Idea—of	  woman,	  that	  is	  
too	  obedient	  to	  a	  sex—to	  an	  Idea	  of	  sex—or	  to	  a	  fetish	  sex	  has	  already	  frozen	  into	  
phallomorphism.”34	  Soon	  after,	  she	  says:	  
Woman	  is	  not	  to	  be	  related	  to	  any	  simple	  designatable	  being,	  subject,	  or	  entity.	  Nor	  is	  the	  
whole	  group	  (called)	  women.	  One	  woman	  +	  one	  woman	  +	  one	  woman	  will	  never	  add	  up	  to	  
some	  generic	  entity:	  woman.	  (The/a)	  woman	  refers	  to	  what	  cannot	  be	  defined,	  
enumerated,	  formulated	  or	  formalized.	  Woman	  is	  a	  common	  noun	  for	  which	  no	  identity	  can	  
be	  defined.35	  
	  
In	  these	  quotes,	  Irigaray	  appears	  to	  adopt	  a	  view	  of	  the	  feminine	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  
symbolic	  rather	  than	  strictly	  biological.36	  Applying	  Irigaray’s	  conception	  of	  the	  feminine	  
body	  to	  all	  bodies,	  I	  argue	  that	  ill	  bodies	  are	  symbolically	  similar	  to	  feminized	  bodies.	  The	  
characteristics	  of	  bodies	  in	  illness	  defy	  the	  phallocentric	  prescription	  of	  coherence,	  solidity,	  
unity,	  and	  closure	  across	  gender	  or	  sex	  lines.	  Illness	  as	  defined	  by	  phallocentric	  culture—
abnormal	  functioning	  of	  the	  body—corresponds	  to	  bodies	  that	  release	  fluids	  and	  smells,	  
feel	  internal	  pain,	  and,	  in	  death,	  cease	  to	  function	  as	  living.	  Ill	  bodies	  exist	  outside	  of	  the	  
binaries	  imposed	  by	  phallocentric	  culture,	  and	  thus	  are	  “feminine”	  in	  Irigaray’s	  sense	  of	  the	  
term.	  The	  qualities	  that	  Irigaray	  identifies	  as	  feminine—those	  that	  symbolically	  undermine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Irigaray,	  Speculum,	  191.	  
34	  Ibid.,	  229.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  230.	  
36	  At	  these	  points	  in	  her	  work,	  it	  seems	  that	  any	  prescriptive	  description	  of	  either	  the	  
female	  or	  male	  body	  would	  contradict	  Irigaray’s	  goal	  of	  disrupting	  phallic	  coherence	  and	  
metaphysical	  truth	  claims.	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phallocentric	  bodily	  ideals—are	  qualities	  of	  all	  human	  bodies.	  Turning	  back	  now	  to	  
Plummer’s	  journal,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  illness	  amplifies	  these	  “feminine”	  qualities	  within	  
bodies.	  
Within	  Plummer’s	  narrative,	  his	  changing	  perspective	  of	  his	  body	  corresponds	  to	  
Irigaray’s	  feminine	  category	  and	  imagery.	  Plummer’s	  profound	  change	  in	  subjectivity	  
corresponds	  with	  his	  changing	  body,	  a	  change	  that	  is	  relayed	  in	  Irigarayan	  language.	  
Specifically,	  his	  illness	  brings	  him	  from	  phallocentric	  subjectivity	  to	  an	  Irigarayan	  
“feminine”	  subjectivity.	  Plummer’s	  journal	  reflects	  his	  changing	  sense	  of	  body,	  the	  sensible;	  
while	  before	  his	  illness,	  he	  conceives	  of	  his	  body	  as	  containing	  only	  his	  own	  identity,	  as	  his	  
outer	  limits	  and	  a	  closed	  system,	  he	  comes	  to	  understand	  himself	  as	  a	  multiple,	  fluid,	  
interconnected	  and	  dependent	  body.	  The	  parallels	  between	  Irigaray’s	  feminine	  and	  
Plummer’s	  ill	  body	  appear	  not	  only	  with	  specific	  imagery—not-­‐oneness,	  fluidity,	  non-­‐
rationality,	  non-­‐visibility,	  etc.—but	  also	  with	  the	  subversive	  shift	  away	  from	  phallocentric	  
subjectivity.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  these	  parallels	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  reading	  of	  Plummer’s	  
text	  as	  expressive	  of	  Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental.	  
	  
III.	  A	  Proposal	  for	  Rethinking	  the	  Ill	  Body	  
	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  introduce	  Irigaray’s	  concept	  of	  divinity,	  which	  she	  calls	  the	  
sensible	  transcendental.	  I	  will	  discuss	  its	  roots	  in	  19th	  Century	  philosopher	  Ludwig	  
Feuerbach’s	  theory	  of	  projection	  and	  argue	  that	  her	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “divine”	  lies	  in	  its	  
authenticating,	  rather	  than	  theistic,	  value.	  I	  will	  explain	  my	  own	  interpretation	  of	  Irigaray’s	  
“sensible	  transcendental”	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  topic,	  and	  finally	  offer	  a	  reading	  of	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Plummer’s	  text	  as	  sensibly	  transcendent.	  I	  argue	  that	  Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  a	  
useful	  model	  for	  bodies	  in	  Western	  culture	  suffering	  from	  illness,	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  ill	  
bodies	  to	  re-­‐conceive	  of	  themselves	  as	  non-­‐religiously	  but	  still	  divinely	  valuable.	  
Readers	  of	  Irigaray,	  especially	  North	  American	  feminist	  scholars,	  struggle	  with	  the	  
concept	  of	  “divinity”	  in	  her	  work.	  While	  some	  interpreters	  understand	  the	  feminine	  divine	  
as	  separate	  from	  what	  they	  see	  as	  her	  more	  critically	  attuned	  deconstruction	  of	  
phallocentrism,	  others	  interpret	  the	  feminine	  divine	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Irigaray’s	  larger	  
deconstructive	  project.	  Specifically,	  the	  former	  group	  worries	  that	  Irigaray’s	  revision	  of	  the	  
notion	  of	  divinity	  doubles	  back	  on	  the	  liberating	  critical	  work	  Irigaray	  accomplished	  in	  
earlier	  texts.	  Feminist	  philosophers	  of	  religion	  studying	  Irigaray	  question	  whether	  her	  
feminine	  divinity	  can	  sufficiently	  liberate	  women	  from	  traditional	  notions	  of	  divinity,	  which	  
have	  often	  linked	  women	  to	  the	  body	  and	  then	  vilified	  the	  body	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  
masculine	  spirit.	  I	  will	  briefly	  engage	  with	  some	  of	  these	  interpreters	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  
Irigaray’s	  use	  of	  “divinity.	  
While	  Irigaray	  appears	  at	  times	  to	  condemn	  belief	  as	  a	  departure	  from	  reality,37	  she	  
generally	  argues	  that	  women	  need	  to	  embrace	  a	  revised	  divinity	  rather	  than	  rejecting	  
divinity	  outright.	  She	  writes,	  “Divinity	  is	  what	  we	  need	  to	  become	  free,	  autonomous,	  
sovereign.	  No	  human	  subjectivity,	  no	  human	  society	  has	  ever	  been	  established	  without	  the	  
help	  of	  the	  divine.”38	  Theologian	  Serene	  Jones	  points	  out	  that	  in	  Irigaray’s	  use	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  “Belief	  Itself,”	  in	  Irigaray,	  Sexes	  and	  Genealogies,	  25-­‐53.	  
38	  Ibid.,	  62.	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Feuerbach’s	  model,	  God	  is	  merely	  an	  amalgam	  of	  idealized	  human	  characteristics,	  meaning	  
that	  the	  divine	  is	  an	  “imagined	  screen.”39	  	  
Following	  Feuerbach’s	  theory	  of	  projection,	  Irigaray	  argues	  for	  women’s	  adoption	  of	  
a	  divine	  in	  their	  image.	  According	  to	  Irigaray,	  women	  need	  an	  ideal,	  the	  perfection	  or	  
horizon	  of	  the	  feminine	  gender,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  feminine	  subjectivity	  individually	  and	  
collectively	  as	  a	  gender.40	  For	  scholar	  Amy	  Hollywood,	  Irigaray’s	  contradictory	  embrace	  
and	  call	  for	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  divine	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  replacing	  the	  species	  as	  the	  
impetus	  for	  projection	  in	  Feuerbach’s	  model	  with	  sexual	  difference	  in	  Irigaray’s	  
appropriation.41	  According	  to	  Hollywood,	  within	  Feuerbach’s	  model	  human	  beings	  
recognize	  the	  ideal	  nature	  of	  the	  human	  species	  (including	  characteristics	  of	  goodness,	  
love,	  justice,	  etc.)	  that	  spans	  beyond	  the	  individual’s	  lifetime.42	  Caught	  between	  this	  ideal	  
species	  nature	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  embody	  this	  nature	  on	  an	  individual	  and	  finite	  level,	  
humans	  project	  these	  qualities	  outward	  and	  attribute	  them	  to	  the	  divine.43	  In	  this	  way,	  
ideal	  qualities	  become	  distanced	  from	  their	  human	  origin,	  and	  we	  misattribute	  these	  
qualities	  to	  God.44	  Hollywood	  argues	  that	  when	  Irigaray	  uses	  Feuerbach’s	  model,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Serene	  Jones,	  “Divining	  Women:	  Luce	  Irigaray	  and	  Feminist	  Theology,”	  Yale	  French	  
Studies	  no.	  87	  (1995),	  56.	  Jones	  argues	  that	  Irigaray’s	  uncritical	  use	  of	  Feuerbach	  is	  
problematic	  due	  to	  the	  intended	  universality	  of	  his	  explanation	  of	  religion.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  
goal	  of	  my	  paper	  to	  discuss	  Irigaray’s	  use	  of	  Feuerbach	  and	  its	  accuracy	  or	  implications.	  For	  
more	  on	  Feuerbach’s	  projection	  mechanism,	  see	  the	  introduction	  to	  Ludwig	  Feuerbach,	  On	  
the	  Essence	  of	  Christianity,	  trans.	  Marian	  Evans	  (London:	  Kegan	  Paul,	  Trench,	  Trübner,	  &	  
Co.,	  1890).	  For	  a	  summary,	  see	  Van	  A.	  Harvey,	  Feuerbach	  and	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Religion,	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  
40	  Irigaray,	  Sexes	  and	  Genealogies,	  62.	  
41	  Hollywood,	  Sensible	  Ecstasy,	  213.	  
42	  Ibid.,	  230.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  230.	  
44	  Ibid..	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universalized	  basis	  for	  projection	  becomes	  not	  human	  nature	  generally,	  but	  sexual	  
difference.45	  
The	  interpretations	  of	  Irigaray’s	  divine	  most	  valuable	  for	  my	  own	  project	  
understand	  the	  divine	  as	  a	  potentially	  a-­‐theistic	  set	  of	  values.	  The	  divine	  for	  these	  
interpreters	  is	  what	  grounds	  the	  culture	  of	  Western	  thought.	  Values	  attributed	  to	  the	  
divine	  and	  the	  framework	  in	  which	  we	  imagine	  the	  divine	  inform	  the	  ways	  we	  imagine	  
ourselves	  as	  subjects.	  Elizabeth	  Grosz	  explicitly	  attempts	  to	  defend	  Irigaray	  against	  what	  
she	  sees	  as	  essentialist	  misreadings	  by	  positing	  Irigaray’s	  interest	  in	  the	  divine	  as	  directly	  
linked	  to	  her	  “critique	  and	  displacement”	  of	  Western	  thought.46	  For	  Grosz,	  Irigaray’s	  divine	  
does	  not	  represent	  a	  regression	  to	  the	  patriarchal	  (Feuerbachian)	  God;	  rather,	  it	  is	  “part	  of	  
a	  project	  of	  creating	  an	  ideal	  self-­‐image	  for	  women”	  to	  ground	  a	  culture	  more	  in	  line	  with	  
women’s	  interests.47	  The	  feminine	  divine	  reflects	  women’s	  social	  and	  political	  struggles,	  
and	  is	  almost	  irreligious	  as	  “a	  political	  and	  textual	  strategy	  for	  the	  positive	  reinscription	  of	  
women’s	  bodies,	  identities,	  and	  futures	  in	  relation	  to	  and	  in	  exchange	  with	  the	  other	  sex.”48	  
Penelope	  Deutscher	  similarly	  reads	  Irigaray’s	  positing	  of	  the	  feminine	  divine	  as	  a	  critique	  
and	  revision	  of	  the	  patriarchal	  divine.49	  Irigaray,	  she	  argues,	  “is	  clearly	  attempting	  to	  
change	  our	  notion	  of	  what	  ‘divine’	  means.”50	  Rather	  than	  the	  distanced,	  completely	  
transcendent	  God	  of	  traditional	  Christian	  theology	  and	  Feuerbach,	  Irigaray’s	  feminine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Ibid.,	  231-­‐232;	  Hollywood	  leaves	  open	  the	  definitions	  of	  man,	  woman,	  and	  sexual	  
difference,	  pointing	  to	  a	  few	  different	  interpretations.	  Ultimately,	  Hollywood	  critiques	  
Irigaray’s	  focus	  on	  sexual	  difference	  as	  fetishistic.	  	  
46	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	  “Irigaray	  and	  the	  Divine,”	  in	  Transfigurations:	  Theology	  and	  the	  French	  
Feminists,	  ed.	  C.	  W.	  Maggie	  Kim	  et	  al.	  (Minneapolis,	  MN:	  Fortress	  Press,	  1993),	  199.	  
47	  Ibid.,	  202.	  
48	  Ibid.,	  214.	  
49	  Penelope	  Deutscher,	  “‘The	  Only	  Diabolical	  Thing	  About	  Women...’:	  Luce	  Irigaray	  on	  
Divinity,”	  Hypatia	  9,	  no.	  4	  (1994):	  88-­‐111.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  98.	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divine	  would	  be	  continuous	  with	  humanity	  as	  well	  as	  transcendent.	  While	  the	  traditionally	  
transcendent	  God	  is	  vertically	  transcendent-­‐hierarchically	  above	  humanity-­‐Irigaray’s	  
divine	  would	  be	  vertically	  as	  well	  as	  horizontally	  transcendent.	  Since	  the	  divine	  is	  located	  
within	  humans,	  and	  even	  “interchangeable	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘woman-­‐as-­‐difference,’”	  the	  
divine	  is	  horizontally	  transcendent	  as	  it	  exists	  within	  another	  human	  of	  irreducible	  
difference.51	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  the	  divine	  would	  exist	  within	  other	  people	  who	  will	  
always	  be	  different	  from	  me,	  thus	  unknowable,	  I	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  access	  completely	  the	  
divine	  within	  others.	  This	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  model	  of	  transcendence	  allows	  Irigaray	  to	  
reject	  the	  traditional	  transcendence	  of	  God	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  divine	  as	  an	  ideal	  
horizon	  of	  gender	  identity.52	  Deutscher	  argues	  that	  Irigaray’s	  divine	  is	  a	  philosophical	  and	  
ethical	  category	  that	  only	  retains	  otherness	  and	  a	  type	  of	  transcendence	  from	  conventional	  
divinity.53	  For	  Deutscher,	  this	  divine	  is	  completely	  different	  than	  the	  transcendent	  or	  
supernatural;	  “it	  means	  that	  which	  is	  open-­‐ended	  and	  in	  a	  process	  of	  becoming.”54	  In	  
response	  to	  charges	  of	  essentialism	  leveled	  at	  Irigaray’s	  feminine	  divine,	  Deutscher	  argues	  
that	  Irigaray	  never	  defines	  a	  universal	  feminine	  essence,	  but	  instead	  proposes	  a	  plurality	  of	  
feminine	  identities.55	  Further,	  she	  argues	  that	  Irigaray	  emphasizes	  the	  open-­‐endedness	  or	  
infinity	  of	  gender.56	  Deutscher’s	  defense	  of	  Irigaray’s	  divine	  identifies	  the	  divine	  as	  a	  facet	  
of	  Irigaray’s	  larger	  objective:	  “the	  subversion	  of	  appropriative	  relationships	  between	  self	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Deutscher,	  “Luce	  Irigaray	  on	  Divinity”	  98-­‐99.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  102-­‐103.	  
53	  Ibid.,	  100.	  
54	  Ibid.,	  102.	  
55	  Ibid.,	  107.	  
56	  Ibid..	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and	  other.”57	  In	  Deutscher’s	  view,	  Irigaray	  follows	  Feuerbach’s	  model	  of	  projection,	  but	  
with	  a	  completely	  different	  conception	  of	  the	  divine.	  	  
The	  most	  important	  element	  of	  Irigaray’s	  call	  for	  a	  feminine	  divine	  for	  my	  purposes	  
is	  the	  valuing	  power	  she	  attributes	  to	  divinity	  in	  Western	  culture:	  “Divinity	  is	  what	  we	  need	  
to	  become	  free,	  autonomous,	  sovereign.	  No	  human	  subjectivity,	  no	  human	  society	  has	  ever	  
been	  established	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  divine.”58	  Irigaray	  is,	  in	  my	  interpretation,	  
assuming	  divinity’s	  power	  for	  organizing	  cultural	  values	  and	  thus	  supporting	  human	  
subjectivity.	  While	  some	  feminist	  scholars	  have	  questioned	  this	  stance	  as	  overly	  simplistic	  
in	  terms	  of	  women’s	  liberation	  from	  patriarchy,	  I	  agree	  that	  divinized	  qualities,	  especially	  
those	  of	  bodily	  realities	  expressed	  through	  language,	  can	  hold	  incredible	  mediating	  power.	  
For	  example,	  feminist	  scholar	  Paula	  Cooey	  takes	  this	  approach	  to	  religious	  symbols	  in	  her	  
1994	  book	  Religious	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Body.59	  Using	  narratives	  of	  bodies	  in	  extreme	  
pain,	  she	  demonstrates	  that	  religious	  symbols	  mediate	  the	  experiences	  of	  even	  non-­‐
religious	  individuals.	  	  
It	  is	  with	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  power	  of	  “the	  divine”	  that	  Irigaray	  proposes	  a	  
divine	  projection	  that	  will	  support	  women’s	  subjectivity,	  the	  “sensible	  transcendental.”	  In	  
order	  to	  become	  representable	  subjects	  in	  discourse,	  women	  must	  project	  a	  divine	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  the	  sensible	  transcendental.	  Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  both	  a	  mode	  of	  
projection—transcending	  yet	  rooted	  in	  the	  body—and	  the	  “divinity”	  itself.60	  By	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Deutscher,	  “Luce	  Irigaray	  on	  Divinity,”	  104.	  
58	  Irigaray,	  Sexes	  and	  Genealogies,	  62.	  	  	  
59	  Cooey,	  Religious	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Body.	  
60	  Irigaray	  is	  inconsistent	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  an	  actual	  deity;	  she	  does	  mention	  some	  specific	  
deities	  (for	  example	  in	  her	  first	  work,	  Speculum,	  she	  narrates	  a	  female	  mystic	  relating	  to	  the	  
feminized	  Jesus’	  wounded	  body),	  but	  she	  also	  states	  that	  she	  is	  not	  appealing	  to	  any	  specific	  
divine	  being.	  See	  Joy,	  “Equality	  or	  Divinity:	  A	  False	  Dichotomy?”	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“sensible,”	  Irigaray	  means	  grounded	  in	  the	  body	  and	  its	  sensible	  experience.	  Within	  her	  
thought,	  this	  “sensible”	  applies	  to	  female	  bodily	  specificity;	  for	  example,	  she	  discusses	  
female	  sexuality—the	  constant	  touching	  of	  the	  two	  “lips”—as	  the	  repressed	  sensible.	  This	  
sensibility	  is	  repressed	  because	  the	  feeling	  of	  the	  two	  lips	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  
representable	  through	  discourse.	  In	  order	  for	  repressed	  feminine	  subjectivity	  to	  emerge	  
into	  and	  through	  discourse,	  bodily	  specificity	  must	  enter	  discourse.	  The	  sensible	  
transcendental,	  then,	  represents	  a	  “political	  and	  textual	  strategy	  for	  the	  positive	  
reinscription	  of	  women’s	  bodies,	  identities,	  and	  futures.”61	  This	  means	  that	  through	  
language,	  qualities	  that	  are	  feminine	  will	  be	  projected	  into	  the	  transcendent	  realm,	  such	  
that	  women	  will	  be	  able	  to	  situate	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  values.	  The	  “sensible”	  
aspect	  of	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  Irigaray	  “embracing	  the	  flesh.”62	  While	  Irigaray	  
sees	  traditional	  Western	  notions	  of	  transcendence	  as	  seeking	  to	  escape	  the	  body,	  the	  
transcendence	  of	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  body’s	  experience.	  The	  
body’s	  experience	  is	  what	  guides	  interactions	  and	  ethics	  in	  her	  sensible	  transcendental.	  
The	  “transcendent”	  element	  of	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  refers	  to	  a	  few	  
interrelated	  ideas.	  The	  individual	  body	  is	  transcended	  both	  vertically	  and	  horizontally	  in	  
the	  sensible	  transcendental.	  First,	  on	  the	  horizontal	  plane,	  each	  sex	  is	  transcendent	  to	  the	  
other	  because	  of	  the	  incomprehensibility	  of	  sexual	  difference.	  For	  Irigaray,	  one	  can	  never	  
hope	  to	  fully	  know	  or	  understand	  the	  bodily	  experience	  of	  the	  sexually	  different	  “other.”	  
“Who	  or	  what	  the	  other	  is,”	  she	  writes,	  “I	  never	  know.	  But	  the	  other	  who	  is	  forever	  
unknowable	  is	  the	  one	  who	  differs	  from	  me	  sexually.”63	  Each	  sexually	  different	  individual,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Grosz,	  “Irigaray	  and	  the	  Divine,”	  210.	  
62	  Deutscher,	  “Luce	  Irigaray	  on	  Divinity,”	  96.	  
63	  Irigaray,	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference,	  13.	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as	  well	  as	  each	  sex,	  transcends	  the	  other;	  embodied	  sexual	  difference,	  the	  sensible,	  is	  the	  
basis	  for	  this	  transcendence.	  Rather	  than	  appropriating	  the	  other	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  self,	  
as	  phallic	  subjectivity	  does	  with	  the	  feminine,	  each	  subject	  may	  respect	  the	  unknowable	  
difference	  of	  the	  other.64	  Respect	  for	  difference	  becomes	  a	  kind	  of	  transcendence,	  allowing	  
each	  subject	  to	  flourish	  individually	  and	  as	  part	  of	  a	  gender.	  So,	  for	  Irigaray,	  the	  sensible	  
transcendental	  supports	  an	  ethics	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect	  for	  embodied	  difference.	  
Second,	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  also	  vertically	  transcendent	  because	  it	  is	  
divine.	  As	  is	  typical	  of	  Irigaray,	  her	  writing	  dances	  around	  any	  single	  definition	  of	  divinity.	  
While	  interpretations	  of	  Irigaray’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  vary,	  I	  take	  her	  use	  of	  divinity	  to	  be	  
primarily	  based	  in	  its	  authenticating	  value.	  “Divine”	  here	  denotes	  a	  sense	  of	  ultimate	  value	  
and	  what	  Irigaray	  calls	  “the	  possible”	  rather	  than	  an	  actual	  divine	  being.	  Throughout	  her	  
work,	  Irigaray	  stresses	  that	  divinity	  supports	  masculine	  subjectivity	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	  support	  feminine	  subjectivity	  as	  well.	  The	  divine,	  she	  writes,	  can	  “upset	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  
possible.”65	  This	  means	  that	  divinity	  concerns	  what	  is	  ultimate	  or	  infinite;	  divinity	  validates	  
and	  authenticates	  whatever	  qualities	  are	  projected	  as	  divine.	  Irigaray	  calls	  for	  the	  sensible	  
transcendental	  as	  divine	  because	  of	  what	  divinity	  has	  meant	  to	  men	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
Western	  phallocentric	  culture.66	  Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  projection	  is	  a	  
“realization—here	  and	  now—in	  and	  through	  the	  body”	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  “inaccessible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  This	  relation,	  maintaining	  distance,	  allows	  for	  the	  other	  to	  be	  met	  with	  wonder.	  See	  
Irigaray,	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference,	  72-­‐82.	  
65	  Ibid.,	  128.	  
66	  Interpretations	  of	  Irigaray’s	  divine	  vary	  greatly;	  Elizabeth	  Grosz	  points	  to	  a	  few:	  “the	  
source	  and	  justification	  of	  (Western	  knowledge),”	  the	  “ontological	  framework	  for	  our	  
understanding	  of	  reality,”	  the	  “horizon	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  subject’s	  identity	  as	  a	  
subject,”	  an	  “ideal	  of	  perfection,”	  and	  an	  “emblem	  of	  a	  supreme	  alterity	  that	  institutes	  
ethics.”	  See	  Grosz,	  “Irigaray	  and	  the	  Divine,”	  207.	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transcendence.”67	  Rather	  than	  a	  divine	  being	  that	  would	  support	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  
body—the	  incorporeal	  and	  transcendent	  Western	  God—the	  sensible	  transcendental	  
incorporates	  and	  validates	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  (feminine)	  body.	  The	  Western	  God,	  the	  
masculine	  ultimate	  horizon	  for	  Irigaray,	  represents	  the	  divinization	  of	  phallic	  
characteristics:	  for	  example,	  omnipotent,	  supra-­‐rational	  or	  rational,	  dominant,	  and	  
autonomous.	  These	  values—power,	  dominance,	  autonomy,	  rationality,	  and	  bodily	  
transcendence—projected	  onto	  God	  gain	  cultural	  value.	  The	  Western	  version	  of	  God	  
supports	  masculine	  subjectivity	  in	  these	  characteristics.	  
The	  sensible	  transcendental	  aims	  to	  disrupt	  traditional	  Western	  notions	  of	  divinity	  
that	  Irigaray	  believes	  devalue	  the	  body	  by	  upholding	  a	  mind-­‐body	  dualism.	  The	  sensible	  
transcendental	  is	  the	  ultimate	  valuation	  of	  feminine	  qualities,	  resulting	  in	  “a	  horizon	  for	  
self-­‐idealization,	  a	  model	  to	  emulate”	  for	  women.68	  Rooted	  in	  the	  body,	  the	  sensible	  
transcendental	  is	  what	  Amy	  Hollywood	  calls	  “transcendence	  within	  and	  through	  
immanence.”69	  It	  is	  the	  process	  of	  bringing	  bodily	  specificity	  into	  the	  transcendent	  realm	  
where	  this	  specificity	  can	  gain	  signifying	  power.	  For	  Irigaray,	  the	  transcendent	  realm	  is	  
home	  to	  the	  divine.	  Ultimate	  values,	  projected	  as	  divine,	  serve	  as	  horizons	  towards	  which	  
each	  gender	  strives.	  Irigaray	  insists	  that	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  for	  women	  be	  rooted	  
in	  the	  sensible	  and	  therefore	  always	  unfolding,	  changing,	  and	  developing.70	  The	  sensible	  
transcendental	  is	  a	  continual	  process	  grounded	  in	  the	  changing,	  living	  body.	  Within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Irigaray,	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference,	  148.	  
68	  Grosz,	  “Irigaray	  and	  the	  Divine,”	  210.	  
69	  Hollywood,	  Sensible	  Ecstasy,	  199.	  
70	  Interestingly,	  some	  scholars	  interpret	  Irigaray	  as	  problematically	  delineating	  these	  
“feminine”	  qualities,	  while	  others	  argue	  that	  she	  deliberately	  leaves	  classification	  of	  the	  
feminine	  open-­‐ended.	  For	  examples	  of	  each	  position	  respectively,	  see	  Joy,	  Divine	  Love;	  
Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic.”	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Irigaray’s	  feminine,	  development	  is	  not	  linear,	  or	  moving	  towards	  an	  ideal.	  Any	  proposed	  
divine	  must	  be	  in	  flux	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  phallic	  concreteness	  and	  coherence.	  Any	  sensible	  
transcendental	  must	  be	  continually	  evolving,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  infinite	  permutations	  of	  
bodily	  forms	  and	  sensations.	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  an	  especially	  
useful	  model	  for	  bodies	  who	  experience	  illness	  because	  these	  bodies	  are	  in	  an	  immediate	  
state	  of	  change.	  	  
I	  propose,	  then,	  that	  Plummer’s	  text	  can	  be	  read	  as	  projecting	  his	  ill	  body’s	  
physicality	  in	  an	  Irigarayan	  fashion	  to	  help	  establish	  full	  subjectivity	  in	  his	  changed	  and	  
changing	  body.	  Plummer’s	  account	  of	  his	  illness,	  his	  process	  of	  “speaking	  the	  body,”	  
arguably	  represents	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  because	  through	  his	  language,	  his	  body	  
enters	  discourse.	  Through	  discourse—transcendence	  of	  the	  sensible—the	  experience	  of	  his	  
ill	  body	  can	  enter	  the	  imagination	  of	  others.71	  In	  this	  process,	  his	  body	  is	  transcended	  
horizontally.	  	  
The	  vertical	  transcendence	  of	  the	  body	  in	  Plummer’s	  narrative	  occurs	  with	  his	  often	  
jarring,	  expressive	  language	  for	  shifts	  in	  his	  body.	  Expressing	  his	  shifting	  bodily	  experience	  
in	  words	  that	  shock,	  disgust,	  or	  scare	  readers	  may	  force	  readers	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  
non-­‐phallocentric	  reality	  of	  his	  body.	  Through	  his	  language,	  a	  non-­‐phallocentric	  
subjectivity	  of	  illness	  begins	  to	  take	  shape	  in	  the	  transcendent	  realm.	  Like	  Irigaray,	  
Plummer	  expresses	  the	  reality	  of	  his	  non-­‐phallocentric,	  particular	  bodily	  experience	  and	  
reality	  in	  language	  that	  defies	  the	  assumptions	  and	  ideals	  of	  phallocentrism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Margaret	  Whitford	  sees	  this	  process	  occur	  in	  those	  feminist	  scholars	  who	  engage	  with	  
Irigaray’s	  feminine	  bodily	  imagery;	  even	  if	  it	  is	  limited	  to	  that	  small	  group,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  
imagery	  is	  powerful	  because	  it	  allows	  a	  particular	  embodied	  subjectivity	  (the	  sensible)	  to	  
enter	  the	  symbolic	  realm.	  See	  Whitford,	  “Irigaray’s	  Body	  Symbolic.”	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While	  no	  individual	  account	  can	  speak	  definitely	  for	  ill	  bodies	  as	  a	  whole,	  I	  suggest	  
that	  Plummer’s	  account	  of	  his	  experience	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  initial	  tracing	  out	  of	  a	  sensible	  
transcendental	  for	  ill	  bodies.	  In	  disrupting	  his	  own	  phallic	  conception	  of	  his	  body,	  Plummer	  
exhibits	  qualities	  that	  Irigaray	  attributes	  to	  feminine	  bodies.	  Reflecting	  Irigaray’s	  imagery,	  
Plummer’s	  body	  becomes	  more	  fluid	  in	  various	  ways.	  Previously	  hidden	  bodily	  fluids—
blood,	  bile,	  etc.—are	  now	  visible	  and	  cross	  the	  imagined	  boundaries	  of	  his	  body.	  The	  
crossing	  of	  these	  boundaries	  by	  fluids	  and	  also	  by	  machines,	  tubes,	  and	  surgeons	  disrupt	  
his	  notion	  of	  his	  body	  as	  bounded.	  Plummer	  experiences	  a	  lack	  of	  conscious	  or	  rational	  
control	  of	  his	  body	  that	  he	  had	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  his	  health;	  an	  Irigarayan	  subversion	  of	  
traditional	  (phallic)	  logic	  is	  at	  play	  in	  his	  expressing	  his	  changing	  bodily	  experience.	  Like	  
Irigaray’s	  female,	  Plummer	  experiences	  his	  ill	  body	  as	  multiple.	  Related	  in	  Irigarayan	  
language,	  we	  might	  say	  Plummer’s	  ill	  body	  is	  not-­‐one.	  Not	  only	  do	  multiple	  identities	  exist	  
within	  Plummer	  corresponding	  to	  bodily	  experiences,	  but	  also	  his	  identity	  as	  singular	  actor	  
becomes	  one	  inseparable	  from	  his	  community.	  Plummer	  comes	  to	  share	  his	  body	  with	  his	  
transplant	  donor	  in	  a	  unique	  way	  that	  I	  see	  as	  parallel	  to	  Irigaray’s	  imagery	  of	  feminine	  lips	  
(two,	  not	  divisible	  to	  ones).72	  Operating	  like	  Irigaray’s	  proposed	  sensible	  transcendental,	  
Plummer	  expresses	  his	  sensible—the	  reality	  of	  his	  ill	  body—through	  the	  transcendent—
language.	  	  
For	  many	  ill	  or	  differently	  functioning	  bodies,	  imagining	  an	  actual	  deity	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  own	  physicality	  is	  powerful	  and	  needed.	  While	  many	  religious	  scholars	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  My	  advisor	  Margaret	  Kamitsuka	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  sharing	  of	  the	  body	  and	  other	  
symptoms	  accentuating	  Plummer’s	  lack	  of	  control	  (like	  the	  release	  of	  blood)	  parallel	  the	  
experience	  of	  pregnancy.	  	  
	   31	  
proposed	  vertically	  transcendent	  divinities,73	  I	  propose	  that	  a	  more	  sensible	  
transcendental	  projection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  language	  is	  at	  work	  for	  Plummer.	  The	  experiences	  
of	  individuals	  like	  Plummer,	  who	  ponders	  but	  ultimately	  recoils	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
“religious,”	  require	  what	  I	  will	  call	  a	  non-­‐religious	  transcendence.	  This	  transcendence	  
occurs	  through	  an	  Irigarayan	  expression	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  body	  in	  non-­‐phallocentric	  
terms.	  While	  conceiving	  of	  his	  body	  as	  a	  phallic	  unit	  leads	  Plummer	  to	  feel	  uncertainty,	  fear,	  
and	  disgust,	  his	  shifted	  bodily	  consciousness	  brings	  him	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  interconnectedness	  
with	  others	  and	  opportunity	  within	  illness.	  Through	  illness	  he	  comes	  to	  understand	  himself	  
as	  supported	  by	  those	  to	  whom	  he	  trusts	  his	  body’s	  control.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  experience,	  
he	  is	  able	  to	  understand	  himself	  as	  dependent	  on	  others	  both	  socially	  and	  in	  intimate	  
physicality	  (the	  sharing	  of	  his	  very	  body).	  Although	  in	  many	  ways,	  the	  physicality	  of	  
Plummer’s	  body	  changes	  drastically	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  disease,	  Plummer	  most	  likely	  
experienced	  non-­‐phallic	  bodily	  realities	  (for	  example,	  the	  controllable	  and	  uncontrollable	  
flow	  of	  liquids	  with	  drinking,	  sweating,	  urinating,	  etc.)	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  these	  
non-­‐phallic	  processes	  occur	  in	  illness	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  met	  with	  more	  explicit	  
recognition	  and	  unease	  for	  Plummer.	  By	  articulating	  his	  body’s	  specificity	  in	  the	  
transcendent	  realm	  of	  language,	  Plummer	  is	  able	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  his	  body	  in	  its	  ill	  
state,	  tracing	  out	  a	  sensible	  transcendental	  of	  his	  ill	  body.	  Reflecting	  Irigaray,	  the	  sensible	  
transcendental	  works	  for	  Plummer	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  by	  mediating	  his	  own	  bodily	  
experience.	  But	  even	  for	  this	  expressly	  non-­‐religious	  individual,	  bodily	  qualities	  expressed	  
in	  language	  gain	  the	  status	  of	  transcendence.	  Plummer’s	  text	  can	  be	  read	  as	  reflecting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  For	  one	  example,	  see	  Nancy	  L.	  Eiesland,	  The	  Disabled	  God:	  Toward	  a	  Liberatory	  Theology	  
of	  Disability	  (Nashville:	  Abingdon	  Press)	  1994.	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Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  because	  he	  is	  establishing	  his	  non-­‐phallic	  bodily	  reality	  
in	  the	  transcendent	  realm.	  	  
While	  what	  I	  see	  in	  Plummer’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  is	  fluid	  borders,	  a	  disrupted	  
sense	  of	  interiority	  and	  exteriority,	  interconnectedness	  and	  interdependence,	  embracing	  
loss	  of	  control	  and	  cohabitation	  of	  the	  body,	  these	  values	  in	  themselves	  do	  not	  represent	  
the	  sensible	  transcendental.	  Rather,	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  here	  lies	  in	  his	  process	  of	  
narrating	  his	  body’s	  non-­‐phallocentric	  physicality.	  Expressing	  the	  body’s	  particularity	  in	  
language	  moves	  the	  sensible	  to	  the	  transcendent.	  Language	  transcends	  the	  individual	  body	  
horizontally	  and	  vertically.	  As	  with	  Irigaray,	  this	  physicality	  largely	  subverts	  phallic	  logic.	  
So,	  rather	  than	  a	  body	  that	  is	  a	  phallic	  one	  (cohesive,	  bounded,	  controlled)	  the	  feminine	  





To	  conclude,	  I	  will	  offer	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  my	  paper	  and	  consider	  possible	  further	  
implications.	  By	  examining	  the	  parallel	  language	  used	  for	  the	  ill	  body	  in	  the	  journal	  of	  
sociologist	  Ken	  Plummer	  and	  the	  feminine	  body	  in	  theorist	  Luce	  Irigaray’s	  work,	  I	  have	  
proposed	  Irigaray’s	  sensible	  transcendental	  as	  a	  possible	  remedy	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  lack	  of	  
representation	  in	  phallocentric	  Western	  culture.	  I	  have	  offered	  my	  reading	  of	  Plummer’s	  
text	  with	  Irigaray’s	  critique	  of	  phallocentrism	  as	  a	  critical	  lens.	  Her	  critique	  of	  
phallocentrism,	  the	  privileging	  of	  phallic	  qualities	  in	  Western	  culture	  at	  large,	  has	  informed	  
my	  interpretation	  of	  Plummer’s	  subjectivity	  throughout	  his	  liver	  disease	  and	  healing.	  My	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reading	  of	  Plummer’s	  journal	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  manifestations	  of	  his	  underlying,	  
phallocentric	  conception	  of	  his	  body,	  and	  outlined	  his	  shift	  in	  perspective.	  After	  connecting	  
the	  language	  he	  uses	  to	  language	  Irigaray	  uses	  for	  the	  feminine,	  I	  argued	  that	  Plummer’s	  ill	  
body	  occupies	  an	  analogous	  place	  to	  the	  feminine	  within	  Irigaray’s	  work.	  I	  finally	  turned	  to	  
Irigaray’s	  remedy	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  women’s	  subjectivity	  from	  Western	  culture,	  the	  
sensible	  transcendental.	  My	  paper	  offers	  one	  interpretation	  of	  Plummer’s	  text	  through	  the	  
lens	  of	  Irigarayan	  theory.	  	  
This	  paper	  represents	  just	  one	  instance	  of	  a	  possible	  sensible	  transcendental.	  I	  think	  
the	  first	  way	  to	  develop	  this	  topic	  further	  would	  be	  to	  include	  many	  more	  perspectives.	  
Including	  narratives	  of	  more	  ill	  bodies	  would	  complicate	  this	  issue	  and	  likely	  lead	  to	  a	  
richer	  set	  of	  conclusions.	  Another	  possible	  area	  of	  expansion	  would	  be	  to	  extend	  its	  scope	  
to	  the	  other	  contemporary	  “French	  feminist”	  authors	  with	  whom	  Irigaray	  is	  often	  linked,	  
including	  Julia	  Kristeva	  and	  Hélène	  Cixous.	  Another	  issue	  that	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  develop	  
in	  this	  paper	  with	  more	  time	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  pain;	  I	  have	  argued	  here	  that	  language	  has	  
power	  to	  mediate	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  body	  and	  illness	  in	  powerful	  ways,	  but	  I	  have	  not	  
specifically	  examined	  the	  experience	  of	  pain.	  Given	  more	  time,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  look	  
specifically	  at	  pain	  as	  a	  factor	  of	  illness;	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  pain	  socially	  determined	  and	  how	  
might	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  include	  the	  experience	  of	  pain?	  Nevertheless,	  I	  close	  by	  
stressing	  again	  the	  importance	  of	  language	  in	  determining	  the	  experience	  of	  bodies	  in	  
Western	  culture;	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  one	  way	  that	  language	  can	  act	  as	  a	  powerful	  cultural	  
and	  social	  mediator.	  Using	  language,	  ill	  bodies	  and	  all	  bodies	  can	  move	  otherwise	  repressed	  
sensible	  realities	  to	  the	  transcendent	  realm	  of	  cultural	  recognition	  and	  value.	  Following	  
Irigaray,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  sensible	  transcendental	  process	  of	  “narrating,	  symbolizing,	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storying,	  even	  performing”74	  the	  body	  can	  positively	  influence	  the	  experience	  ill	  and	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  Multiple	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  Bodies,”	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